Several destination countries still adopt general immigration policies, and are characterized by lower returns to education than the countries of origin of the migrants. These two stylized facts challenge the literature on the beneficial brain drain which demonstrates that migration can increase the average human capital in the sending countries if immigration policies are selective, or the skill premium at destination is higher than at origin. We propose a model with empirically sensible assumptions on immigration policies and skill premia, where individuals face heterogeneous and correlated education and migration costs. The model is consistent with a robust stylized fact, namely that the rate of migration increases with schooling, and it shows that the average level of education of the stayers can be increasing in the probability to migrate even in such a setting. Our simulation results prove that these findings hold for reasonable parameter values. This extends the case for a beneficial brain drain in a further direction.
Introduction
The theoretical literature on the brain drain (Mountford 1997; Stark et al. 1997; Vidal 1998; Beine et al. 2001; Beine et al. 2008) has evidenced that the prospect to migrate can increase the average human capital endowment of the sending country because "higher prospective returns to skills in a foreign country impinge on skill acquisition decisions at home'' (Stark et al. 1997) . This literature models migration as a probabilistic event, and potential migrants chose their level of education when the outcome of the migration lottery is still unknown. This uncertainty entails that educational choices respond to the shape of the expected wage-schooling profile: potential migrants opt for a greater investment in education if the expected profile is steeper than the domestic one. The expected wage profile is certainly steeper when the relative return to education is higher at destination than at origin, as Stark et al. (1997) implicitly assume. Recently, Egger and Felbermayr (2009) argued -in line with Stark et al. (1997) -that there is no room for a beneficial brain drain if one conversely assumes that destination countries are characterized by a lower return to education. This latter assumption is in line with the literature on the self-selection of immigrants (e. g. Chiquiar/Hanson 2005; Grogger/ Hanson 2010; McKenzie/Rapoport 2009), and it seems to be the empirically relevant case. Migrants move to higher income countries, and it is a stylized fact that the relative skill premium is inversely related with the income level of a country, as Figure 1 shows.
Still, the expected wage-schooling profile that potential migrants face can be steeper than the domestic one if destination countries adopt selective immigration policies. In this case, education provides an additional benefit in terms of better chances of migrating to a high-wage country. Selectivity can improve the incentives to invest in schooling, as agents are induced to acquire education "in order to be eligible for emigration'' (Mountford 1997) even if the returns to schooling are lower at destination. Most of the literature (Mountford 1997; Vidal 1998; Beine et al. 2001; Beine et al. 2008) adopts such an assumption with respect to immigration policies. While such an assumption is appropriate for a few destinations -such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, the United States -most destination have not yet adopted selective immigration policies (Bertoli et al. 2009 ).
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The stylized facts on the relative returns to educations in destination and sending countries as well as on skill-selective immigration policies might seem to be at odds with the existing empirical evidence about the occurrence of a beneficial brain drain (see Beine et al. 2001; Beine et al. 2008; Docquier et al. 2008 ).
The purpose of this paper is to show that the theoretical case for a beneficial brain drain still survives even if the return to education is lower at destination and immigration poSource: Authors' elaboration based on the Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) dataset.
Figure 1 Skill premium and GDP per capita 1 licies are not selective with respect to education. We thus extend the theoretical analysis on the effects of migration on the sending countries by allowing for empirically sensible assumptions on the distribution of wages and the policy stance at destination. We also explicitly model the self-selection of potential migrants among the population in the country of origin, which extends the existing knowledge on the mechanisms which drive human capital investment of potential migrants and the allocation of human capital between destination and sending countries.
So far, the literature has treated the higher rate of migration of highly-educated individuals has the exogenously given outcome of the out-selection mechanisms adopted by the countries of destination rather than of a self-selection of the applicants. Mountford (1997) , Stark et al. (1997) , Vidal (1998) and Beine et al. (2001 Beine et al. ( , 2008 assume that all natives are willing to migrate to the high-wage destination, though low-educated individuals are prevented from doing so by selective immigration policies. General immigration policies -which appear to be still the rule rather than the exception -would give rise in these models to an identical representation of high and less educated individuals among migrants.
In contrast, we model the process of self-selection of potential migrants by explicitly introducing migration costs in the model, and we let them vary across individuals. 4 we assume that time-equivalent migration costs are declining with the level of education of an individual. This extension has two crucial implications: first, the return to education -net of migration cost -at destination can be higher than the domestic return to education, and it varies across individuals; second, a pattern of positive selection of the migrants can emerge even when out-selection mechanisms are non-existent.
As a consequence, the impact of a change in the -exogenously given -probability of migration upon the average human capital endowment of the sending country depends on three distinct channels: first, there is the drain effect, which is negative if -as it is empirically sensitive -migrants are positively selected; second, the change in the migration probability exerts an (uneven) influence upon potential migrants' educational choices; third, it reshapes the set of individuals who self-select themselves into migration.
We thus reconcile the finding of the existing beneficial brain drain literature that migration can positively affect the human capital endowment in sending countries without relying on empirically implausible assumptions on the distribution of wages or skill-selective immigration policies. A simulation of our model proves that a beneficial brain drain can occur if we apply reasonable values for the relevant parameters on the distribution of education and migration costs as well as on the relative returns to education.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 the results from the numerical simulation, and Section 4 concludes.
The model
Consider a small isolated economy populated by one-period lived agents, 5 who maximize a utility function that is linear in income.
6 Agents, which are indexed by j, have to chose their optimal level of education s, and they face different educational costs due to a heterogeneous innate learning ability, which we denote with the parameter a. As in Bertoli and Rapoport (2010) , the cost of education is expressed in time-equivalent units: an agent with ability a has to forego a fraction 1-exp(-c(s j ,a j )) of his working time in order to get s years of schooling. We assume that a is distributed over the support (0,1) according to a density function f(a). The function c(s j ,a j ) is assumed to be twice differentiable, and to satisfy the following properties:
Extending on Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2009) , where the level of schooling is exogenously given, the log of the domestic income -net of the cost of schooling -is given by:
Agents have the opportunity to migrate to a foreign country which -as in Chiquiar and Hanson (2005: 242) -is characterized by a lower marginal return to education d 1 , but by a higher baseline component of income, l 1 . Migration entails a time-equivalent cost p(s j ), which -as in Chiquiar and Hanson (2005: 243) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2009) -is assumed to be monotonically decreasing and convex in the level of schooling s j . The foreign log wage -net of both education and migration costs -is given by:
We retain the assumption of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2009) that the marginal return to schooling is higher at destination than at home for low levels of schooling s.
Optimal scholing choices
The unique optimal choice of schooling in case of domestic employment, s 0 (a j ), is defined as:
Eq. (4) entails that the derivative with respect to innate learning ability of the optimalvalue function of domestic wage is given by:
As usual in the brain drain literature, we model migration as a probabilistic event: an individual can migrate with probability p, and the realization of this migration lottery is unknown when agents chose their level of schooling. If an agent opts for migration, then he chooses his level of schooling in a way that he maximizes:
The assumption that the probability to migrate p does not vary with the level of education ensures that Eq. (6) is a concave function of s j , so that the first order condition suffices to identify the optimal level of schooling, s m (a j ), of a potential migrant endowed with a level of innate learning ability a j :
We have that the partial derivative with respect to innate learning ability a j of the optimal-value function of the expected log wage is given by:
Both s 0 (a j ) and s m (a j ) are increasing in the level of innate learning ability a; this entails that is possible to define two functions, s 0 -1 (s) and s m -1 (s) which give the level of innate learning ability of an individual who optimally choses s according to either Eq. (4) or (7). From Eqs. (4) and (7) we observe that s 0 (a j ) and s m (a j ) coincide if and only if the level of innate learning ability is such that:
Labelling a C the level of a such as Eq. (9) holds, we have that s m (a j ) is higher (lower) than s 0 (a j ) for values of innate learning ability below (above) the threshold value a C . This also entails, from Eqs. (5) and (8), that foreign wages are a steeper function of a j than domestic wages up to a C .
The implicit function theorem allows us to determine how the level of schooling s m (a j ) which is optimally chosen by an individual who opts for migration responds to a variation in the probability of migration p; specifically, from Eq. (7), we have that:
Given the assumptions on time-equivalent migration costs p(s j ), Eq. (10) reveals that an increase in the probability to migrate p produces an uneven impact on potential migrants' schooling choices: potential migrants endowed with a level of innate learning ability lower than a C will increase their investment of education, while other potential migrants will conversely lower their optimal level of schooling.
Self-selection into migration
Individuals self-select themselves into migration; specifically, we assume an individual compares the utility from staying in the home country, which is given by Eq. (2) plus a stochastic component e 0j , with the expected utility of opting for migration, which depends upon the expected wage in Eq. (6) and on a stochastic component e 1j , which we assume to be identically and independently distributed across individuals. An agent opts for migration if and only if:
Observe that the two sides of Eq. (11) relate to different levels of schooling, which are determined on the basis of Eqs. (4) and (7). Assuming -as standard in the international migration literature, (e. g. Grogger and Hanson 2008: 6; Beine et al. 2009 ) -that the stochastic term in Eq. (11) follows an Extreme Value Type-1 distribution, then g(a j ):
represents the probability that an agent endowed with a level of innate learning ability equal to a j opts for migration (McFadden, 1974) . Given Eqs. (5) and (8), we know that the function g(a j ) is hump-shaped, and it attains its maximum at a C , the threshold value identified by Eq. (8). Moreover, we have that an increase in the probability of migration p raises g(a j ) for all levels of innate learning ability.
Eq. (12) allows us to define how the share of migrants varies with the level of schooling; any level of schooling s is chosen by potential migrants who are endowed with a level of innate learning ability s m -1 (s), and the size of this set of individuals is given by g(s m -1 (s))Âf(s m -1 (s)), and by the non-migrants, i. e. individuals who do not opt for migration and are endowed with a level of innate learning ability s 0 -1 (s); the size of this second group is given by (1-g(s 0 -1 (s)))Âf(s 0 -1 (s)). Hence, we have that the share of migrants with a level of education equal to s, q(s), is given by:
Now, take the derivative of Eq. (13) with respect to s:
It is easy to verify that -under a non-increasing density function f(a) for innate learning ability -Eq. (14) becomes certainly negative for values of innate learning ability higher than a C . Hence, our model is consistent with a pattern of positive selection in education of the migrants if:
Eq. (15) represents also a sufficient condition if innate learning ability is uniformly distributed in the origin population.
The average level of education of the stayers and of the migrants
The average level of schooling of the migrants, s mig , can be expressed as:
Observe that, as we have assumed that immigration policies are not selective, Eq. (16) also gives us potential migrants' average level of schooling.
The set of stayers is composed by two groups: the potential migrants who -with probabilty (1-p) -failed to migrate, and the non-migrants, i. e. the individuals who did not opt for migration in first place. These two groups took their educational decisions according to Eqs. (7) and (4) respectively. The average level of schooling of the stayers, s res , can thus be expressed as:
If Eq. (14) is positive, then this suffices to claim that s mig 4 s res . 7 There are three distinct ways through which a marginal variation in the probability to migrate p influences the average lelvel of education of the stayers, which represents the focus of the literature on the brain drain. First, there is a drain effect, which is negative as long as migrants are positively selected to begin with. Second, there is a schooling effect, which goes through the influence that the probability to migrate exerts upon potential migrants' education choices. Third, there is a composition effect, which arises as a change in immigration policies influences the set of individuals who self-select themselves into migration.
The partial derivative of Eq. (17) with respect to the probability to migrate p gives us the combined effect of these three distinct channels upon the average level of schooling of the stayers. We have that:
Eq. (18) is positive if and only if:
The three terms in the integrand function that appears in the numerator of Eq. (19) represent the three distinct channels through which a marginal variation in p influences the average level of education of the stayers: the first one is the negative drain effect, the second one is the incentive effect, and the third one is the negative selection effect. It would be analytically cumbersome to sign Eq. (19) for general functional forms the education cost function c(s,a), the migration cost function p(s), and for the distribution f(a) of innate learning ability. We thus resort to a numerical simulation, to show that Eq. (19) can be positive when gross returns to schooling are lower at destination, immigration policies are non-selective and migrants happen to be positively self-selected. We believe that this substantially strenghtens the empirical relevance of the theoretical argument around the occurrence of a beneficial brain drain.
Numerical simulation
We introduce the following functional form for the education cost function c(s,a):
with h40 representing a shifter of schooling cost, and with a40; the higher is a, the more the cost of education declines with innate learning ability Eq. (20) resembles the cost function adopted by Mayr and Peri (2009: 13) , who set a=1, and assume that the total cost is a quadratic rather than cubic function of schooling. For the migration cost function p(s) we opt for:
with k40, which is consistent with the assumptions introduced in Section 2. 8 The distinct advantage of Eqs. (20)- (21) is that they yield closed-form solutions for the optimal level of schooling s 0 (a) chosen by the non-migrants, and for the level s m (a) optimally chosen by potential migrants. Specifically, under Eqs. (20)- (21), Eq. (4) reads:
while Eq. (7), which describes potential migrants' optmal level of schooling reduces to:
Figure 2 plots Eqs. (22)- (23) under a specific set of parameters which are consistent with the assumptions laid in Section 2. Specifically, we assume that the relative returns to schooling at home is 2.5 times higher than at destination, a magnitude that is in line with the data plotted in Figure 1 . Figure 2 evidences that -when the probability to migrate p is equal to 0.1 -the prospect to migrate induces just a subset of potential migrants to chose a level of schooling which is higher than what they would have chosen in the nomigration scenario. The shape of s 0 (a) and s m (a) plotted in Figure 2 entails -from Eq.
(15) -that there is a non-monotonic relationship between innate learning ability and the share of potential migrants g(a). Eqs. (20)- (23) allow us to compute the net income for the non-migrants, and the expected net income for the potential migrants, and hence to determine, according to Eqs. (11)-(12), the share of potential migrants for any given level of innate learning ability a. In order to do so, we need to introduce numerical values for the baseline components of log income l 0 and l 1 , which we set to 10 and 20 respectively. Figure 3 shows that the expected income from migration is higher than the domestic income for non-migrants when a is approximately higher than 0.15, and it thus entails that the share of potential miNotes: parameter values are set to d 0 =2.5, d 1 =1, h=1/3, a=3, k=1.5, p=0.1. Figure 2 Optimal schooling decisions for potential migrants and non-migrants grants is higher in the upper than in the lower part of the spectrum of innate learning ability a, as depicted in Figure 4 . Recall that the shape of Figure 4 is conditional upon the exogenously given probability of migration p, and that the share of migrants for each level of innate learning ability a is given by g(a) times p. Assuming, as in Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001) and Mayr and Peri (2009) , that innate learning ability is uniformly distributed in the population, we are now able to simulate the impact of a variation in the probability of migration p upon the average level of education of the stayers s res . Figure 5 plots the average level of education of the migrants s mig and of the stayers s res against the probability of migration p.
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It shows that -under the set of parameter values adopted in this numerical simulationmigrants are positively self-selected in education, i. e. s mig 4s res , and s res is increasing in the probability to migrate p until this is approximately equal to 10 percent. When this happens, the rate of migration is equal to 5.8 percent, and the level of schooling of the stayers is 1.2 percent higher than in the baseline no-migration scenario. The average level of schooling of the stayers remains higher than in the no-migration scenario until p is equal to 27 percent, and 19.8 percent of the population in the home country migrates to the high-income destination. The numerical simulation reveals that Eqs. (18), which describes the impact of a marginal change in the probability to migrate p upon the average human capital of the stayers s res can indeed be positive even in a context where relative gross returns to schooling are lower at destination than at origin, and no out-selection mechanim is in place. The extension of the case for a beneficial brain drain is obtained in a setting where migrants are better educated than stayers, as the international migration data suggest.
Conclusions
We have presented a model with the following features: it adopts two empirically sensitive assumptions: (i) the relative returns to schooling are lower at destination than at origin, and (ii) destination countries do not in general adopt selective immigration policies. We have also included heterogeneous migration costs, which allow us to make the Notes: parameter values are set to l 0 =10, d 0 =2.5, l 1 =20, d 1 =1, h=1/3, a=3, k=1.5, p=0.1; f(a)=1; years of schooling in the no-migration scenario normalized to 100.
Figure 5 Probability to migrate and the level of schooling of migrants and stayers model consistent with a robust empircal finding of the international migration literature, namely the migrants are postively selected in education. In our model, a variation the probability to migrate p influences the average level of education of the stayers through three distinct channels: a drain effect, a change in the set of individuals who self-select themselves into migration, and an effect which goes through the incentives to invest in education. When migrants are better educated than stayers this latter effect is positivenot necessarily for all potential migrants -and we have shown that this can prevail over the drain and selection effects. The extension of the case for a beneficial brain drain goes through the restrictions that we need to introduce in order to obtain a pattern of positive selection in education even when no out-selection mechanism is in place.
